Research Areas 【 display / non-display 】

Research Areas 【 display / non-display 】

Papers 【 display / non-display 】

Papers 【 display / non-display 】

• Respecting linear orders for supermajority rules

  Yasunori Okumura , 2026.06

  Social Choice and Welfare

  DOI

• Strategic analysis of fair rank-minimizing mechanisms with agent refusal option

  Yasunori Okumura , 2026.06

  Journal of Mathematical Economics

  DOI

• A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules

  Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura , 2026.05

  International Journal of Game Theory

  DOI

• Aggregating incomplete rankings

  Yasunori Okumura , 2025.07

  Mathematical Social Sciences

  DOI

• Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice

  Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura , 2024.06

  Mathematical Social Sciences

  DOI

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Books 【 display / non-display 】

Books 【 display / non-display 】

• 都市・地域・不動産の経済分析

  隅田和人，直井道生，奥村保規 , 2014.03

  慶応義塾出版会 , 非対称な空間競争モデルによる企業・地域の発展と衰退の分析 , 1-329

• 広告の経済分析―ミクロ経済学的アプローチ―

  奥村保規 , 2008.03

  三菱経済研究所 , 1-101

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 【 display / non-display 】

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 【 display / non-display 】

• 0

  Project Period (FY)： 2025/04  -  2028/03  Investigator(s): 北原 稔

  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)  Co-Investigator  25K05004 

• Matching algorithms with ordering costs and flexible acceptance

  Project Period (FY)： 2022/04  -  2025/03  Investigator(s): Kitahara Minoru

  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)  Co-Investigator  22K01402 

  1. Given the current residency matching algorithm, a program can know that an applicant did not list it first, which is consistent with a conditional match rate anomaly in the data.
  2. For the stable improvement problem with partial order priorities, (i) if the model is standard other than that, then for any (student-)optimal stable matching that Pareto dominates an initial stable matching, there is an extension of the original priority profile with which the DA returns the optimal matching, and (ii) within the class of intra-type weak but inter-type partial order priorities satisfying some monotonicity, a counterexample of the sufficiency of the condition for non-existence of a stable improvement proposed by Erdil and Kumano (2019, JET) is provided, while another condition is found to be not only sufficient but also polynomial time.

• A reserch on the nursary school matching systems

  Project Period (FY)： 2019/04  -  2022/03  Investigator(s): Okumura Yasunori

  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)  Principal Investigator  19K01542 

  We consider the system of the nursery schools by using the market design approach especially using the matching theory. There are three problems in the system of the nursery schools in Japan. First one is so-called "nursery school waiting lists problem", which is the problem that in several regions, many nursery schools are over-demanded. Second one is that many children are assigned to a nursery school, but it is inconvenient for their parent(s), for example, the school is far from their home. Third, to avoid assigning no school or an inconvenient school, parent(s) will various strategic behaviors that are often very costly for them.
  We disucss several matching mechanisms to solve these problems.

• 面接とマッチングの制度設計

  Project Period (FY)： 2018/04  -  2021/03  Investigator(s): 北原 稔

  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)  Co-Investigator  18K01513 

Lesson Subject 【 display / non-display 】

Lesson Subject 【 display / non-display 】